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Abstract. This article measures the credit channel’s parameters in monetary policy 
transmission in the CEMAC zone. Having highlighted the limitations of other channels 
with a theoretical and factual assessment, we check the effectiveness of bank credit channel 
through the autoregressive vectors’ method, using consolidated monetary and 
macroeconomic data from six countries in the Zone, from 1960 to 2012. It appears that 
credit channel is narrow. It has a low outflow and a depth-based credit as far as the private 
sector is concerned, while the GDP reacts with a two-year period following a monetary 
policy impulse.  
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1. Introduction 
odern nations are economically asserted because they produce more and 
better. The productive investment financing therefore appears as a 
categorical imperative, questioning both private agents and public 
decision-makers. The good distribution of credit for the improvement of financing 
conditions then appears necessary as a precondition for the establishment of a 
viable production sphere which is a growth bearer. This analysis highlights the 
significance of the monetary variable in the implementation of economic policy for 
the survival of African economies. 
The history of economic facts reveals that financing productive activities in 
most developed economies is operated through a dynamic bank credit during the 
Industrial Revolution. In a more recent period, lessons learned from the 2007-2010 
global financial crisis have generated the entry into force of unconventional
1
 
monetary policies. Incentive mechanisms to the supply of bank credit called 
quantitative easing or credit easing are then increasingly used (Artus, 2014). 
Presently, central banks of developed countries such as Japan, the US and to a 
lesser extent, the European Union (EU), resort to such an expansionary monetary 
policy of easy credit known as "quantitative easing." These measures constitute a 
 
aa Advanced School of Economics and Commerce (ESSEC), University of Douala, Po. Box 1931, 
Cameroon. 
. (237) 677824845 
. ekomane@yahoo.fr 
 b Advanced School of Economics and Commerce (ESSEC), University of Douala, Po. Box 1931, 
Cameroon. 
. (237) 699 98 42 39 
. gsyamb@yahoo.fr 
M 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(4), J.L. Ekomane, & B. Yamb, p.744-766. 
745 
745 
real revolution (Stiglitz, 2013) through which developing countries can get 
inspired, particularly those of the CEMAC Zone. These new strategies recognize 
the relevance of monetary policy and its influence in the real economic sector. An 
intervention of the Central Bank then places credit supply in the centre of such an 
intervention. However, this new context reveals that instruments commonly used 
by central banks do not seem to give full satisfaction in monetary policy 
transmission to the productive sector (Artus & Broyer, 2014). 
In developing countries (DCs) on the contrary, the difficulty to access financing 
was formally identified as the main obstacle faced by companies, especially the 
Small and Medium size Enterprises (SMEs) which are more vulnerable to credits’ 
scarcity (UNO, 2005).  
The concern about monetary policy transmission to the CEMAC Zone 
productive sector is justified for a number of observations: the CEMAC Zone post-
colonial financial system superficially reformed nowadays tends to orient credits 
towards trade rather than productive investment. Monetary cooperation agreements 
signed in 1972 between the French Treasury and the CEMAC member States 
negatively affect the monetary sovereignty of the Bank of Central African States 
(BEAC) according to Guillaumont & Guillaumont (1984). Several financial 
institutions specialized in development financing in the BEAC zone experience 
bankrupt after the 1980s’ economic crisis. Secondary banks that escaped 
bankruptcy and those created after the financial system restructuring remain very 
cautious in terms of credit supply. They are reinforced in this cautious attitude by a 
restrictive monetary policy from the BEAC. The financial liberalization of the 
1990s led to the abandonment of credit direct control instruments in favour of 
indirect instruments. They no longer give room to the government to direct bank 
credit supply towards promising growth activities.   
Economic growth is neither found in the BEAC status nor in the Convention 
governing the Monetary Union of Central Africa (UMAC), thus reflecting the 
negligence of production financing.  
Several reports and studies
2
 reveal, if not, the failure
3
 or at least, the limits of 
the old funding policies such as public aid to African Development (PAD), foreign 
direct investment (FDI), the international debt of developing countries (Ngango, 
1967) and the initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) (Sogge, 
2003).  
Therefore, to overcome the shortcomings observed in credit market and to 
favourably and sustainably influence the economic activity, public authorities 
generally make use of two main economic policy instruments: monetary policy and 
fiscal policy. In particular, monetary policy is able to act on economic financing 
conditions to correct credit market imbalances (Mishkin, 2010). The choice we 
make on monetary policy is then justified by its malleability and flexibility which 
demarcates it from heaviness inherent to the implementation of fiscal policy.  
Most studies have often considered monetary policy transmission channels as 
passive and incidental mechanisms. Credit channel is therefore not seen as an 
endogenous mechanism for facilitating production financing, hence the 
significance and relevance of our study. The issue developed here on production 
monetary financing by credit channel under the leadership of the Central Bank then 
has a dual theoretical and empirical interest.                 
Theoretically, it contributes to both the renewal and extension of the economic 
thought with an application within the framework of a monetary union in 
developing countries. Regarding the renewal of thought, the Keynesian circuit 
theory and that of the post-Keynesian monetary economy of production, they are 
on the agenda as far as production financing is concerned. Both theories are 
therefore of remarkable significance to us because of the limitations and 
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incompleteness of financial markets revealed by financial changes experienced by 
developing countries in general, and those of the CEMAC Zone in particular. 
These are recent crises which different solutions have consecrated the "resurrection 
of Keynes." Regarding the monetary thought extension, credit channel which until 
then was considered as a passive transmission mechanism of monetary policy to 
real economy, is envisaged as part of this work, as an active tool stimulating 
productive investment at the disposal of policymakers. Similarly, we would like to 
make a second extension in our analysis: from the post-Keynesian “production 
monetary economy” to a “production monetary policy”. This is a monetary policy 
based on the currency-credit-production triptych to focus its action towards the 
search for economic growth.   
Empirically speaking, bank credit is still of paramount significance in corporate 
finance process, companies being economic engines in developing countries which 
often lack efficient capital markets such as stock exchanges. And even though the 
latter exist, most Small and Medium size Enterprises (SMEs) and Very Small 
Enterprises (VSEs) have no access to market financing (shares, bonds).  
A credit channel study in the BEAC Zone allows highlighting the malfunctions, 
nature and optimal architecture of financial system, that is to say, the share which 
belongs to the bank and market financing respectively (Pollin & Vaubourg, 1998). 
The question of credit channel’s effectiveness in production financing is 
particularly noteworthy that recent international financial crises and mutations led 
to reflect on the new role of central banks as well as the best types of financing to 
be adopted by various economies. The current debate between the Federal 
Reserve’s (FR) strategy and that of the European Central Bank (ECB) for funding 
or growth is indeed edifying, giving to our study its whole present nature.  
Finally, lessons learned from the 2007-2010 global financial crisis drew 
particular attention on monetary policy transmission. The blocking of transmission 
channels has revived the debate on the economic activity financing with particular 
emphasis on credit channel (Artus, 2014). Central banks therefore seek to "fix" 
these faulty transmission mechanisms (Marchal, 2013). Regarding Developing 
Countries and particularly those of the CEMAC Zone, after observed the mitigated 
results of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and an unsustainable 
external debt, they are engaged in a search logic of very high growth rates for 
economic emergence and poverty reduction. It is therefore appropriate for them to 
make use of all economic policy instruments at their disposal (including monetary 
policy) to achieve these legitimate long or short- term goals.  
Moreover, the mastering of policy transmission allows ensuring that it actually 
reaches the real economy. This transmission issue is still particularly very acute in 
the implementation of monetary policies in Africa (IMF, 2014). Finally, a good 
command of credit channel by the CEMAC countries may not only contribute to 
high growth rates achievement, but also, to the consolidation of productive sphere 
and the diversification of their economies. These are few prerequisites for these 
countries to ensure their economic emergence as well as their inclusion in the very 
competitive globalization process.  
Thus, the main objective of this work is to assess the CEMAC Zone monetary 
policy transmission through credit channel. To achieve this goal, we will first 
highlight the various monetary policy transmission channels usually presented in 
economic literature, while discussing their relevance within the framework of the 
CEMAC monetary policy. This discussion will allow us to assess the most 
appropriate channel of the BEAC monetary policy transmission. Thereafter, we 
will proceed with the evaluation of the selected channel by measuring its 
parameters (width, depth, speed and time), using causality tests and autoregressive 
vectors (VAR). Economic policy recommendations will be formulated based on 
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results obtained to improve the transmission efficiency of monetary policy in the 
zone.  
2. Monetary Policy Transmission Channels: A Brief 
Literature Review  
Economic literature distinguishes a multitude of transmission channels of 
monetary policy that can broadly be reduced to three (3): the interest rate channel, 
the channel for other assets’ prices (stocks, bonds, and currencies) and credit 
channel (Mishkin, 1996). Furthermore, the financial system’s architecture of 
Central Africa (most predominantly of bank financing at the expense of market 
funding) led to be interested in credit channel. The mastery of this transmission 
mechanism would allow the monetary authority of this zone to ensure effective 
allocation of financial resources to the real economic sector.  
In an economy without an efficient financial market, this approach led to be 
interested in the ability of monetary policy to affect (decisions) bank credit supply 
so as to give significant impetus to the financing of the real growth generating 
activity.    
Good monetary policy transmission  contributes to “... ensure a long-term 
growth of money and credit aggregates consistent with output potential growth in 
order to promote a maximum employment level, stable prices and moderate long-
term interest rates” (Mishkin et al., 2010, p. 602).  
Now in-between “Science and the Central Bank’s art", it implies a sound 
decision-making allowing secondary banks to provide sufficient liquidity for 
optimal allocation of credit financial resources in economy (Bordes, 2007).      
Currency is required not only for transaction, precaution and speculation 
purposes. It is also much needed for “financing motive"
4
. This refers to the need for 
a forward advance of required currency to concretize current investment decisions.      
The existence of information asymmetries, nominal rigidities and hysteresis’s
5
 
effect determine the incompleteness, or even the failure of the financial market. 
These patterns provide a full effectiveness to monetary policy and thus its 
transmission to real economy (Pollin, 1999). Recent analyzes, while questioning 
the monetarist doctrine, placed production financing at the centre of their concerns 
(Artus, 2014; Kaldor, 1985; Taylor, 1995; Blanchard & Gali, 2007). Ireland (2004) 
also shows that through a judicious credit supply, currency can be introduced in the 
real cycle analysis because of its crucial role in the financing of real activity.   
In this perspective, banks are seen as key institutions for their money creative 
and distributive liquidity function in economic financing process (Kashyap et al., 
2002). They create money in exchange of loans granted to companies based on 
profitable projects. Companies invest to produce. This production will justify ex-
post the creation of the ex-ante currency. Money created is thus an anticipation of 
future production; this is credit money. The interest we then have on credit channel 
comes from the fact that other transmission channels do not cope with the 
operating efficiency conditions in the CEMAC zone. This goes with the interest 
rates channel and other assets’ prices channels (stocks, exchange rates, housing 
price and land price).  
2.1. Limits to other monetary policy transmission channels’ effectiveness 
in the CEMAC Zone 
The relevance of credit channel study for the CEMAC Zone highlights the 
applicability limits of other transmission mechanisms namely the interest rates’ 
channels and those of other assets’ prices. 
2.1.1. The interest rates channels’ limited scope   
The Keynesian channel of interest rate which the IS-LM model is a reference 
implies that an expansionary monetary policy marked by an increase in money 
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supply (M) induces a decrease of real interest rates (ir ). This reduction in capital 
cost increases investment expenditures (I) which generate (through a multiplier 
effect) an overall increase in production (Y).  
Considering the Fisher’s relation in which the nominal interest rate is equal to 
the sum of the real interest rate i and the inflation rate 
e
, a growth in money supply 
(M) is likely to raise the level of expected price (P
e 
) and thus the anticipated 
inflation (
e 
 ), consequently causing a reduction in real interest rates (ir )  and 
stimulating investment through the interest rate channel. The interest rate’s 
channels as described imply a significant and automatic effect of money supply’s 
increase on interest rate. However, this reaction is not always verified in the 
CEMAC zone. Indeed, interest rates formerly administered until their liberalization 
in 1990, lending rates since then freely negotiated between banks and borrowers 
are no longer an indicative variable for monetary policy. Changes in market’s 
interest rates are less the result of monetary policy that banks’ discretionary 
decisions rely on the borrowers’ quality as well as their negotiating power. 
Artus (2014) also shows, inspired by EU data that monetary policy based on 
interest rates are no longer effective
 6
. In addition, numerous studies, including that 
of Bernanke & Gertler (1995) showed that empirical studies found it very difficult 
to detect a significant incidence of interest rates through capital cost. They consider 
that the failure of interest rates in impulses’ transmission from the Central Bank 
encouraged the search for other mechanisms, notably credit channel (Mishkin, 
1996). Moreover, in the relationship between interest rate i and investment I, 
investment elasticity with respect to interest rate is not guaranteed, hence the need 
to resort to credit channel.  
2.1.2. The structural blockage of other assets prices’ channels: exchange rate 
and Tobin's q 
Meltzer (1995) after Modigliani (1971) considers other assets’ prices (exchange 
rates and share prices) as fundamental in monetary policy transmission. 
2.1.2.1. Exchange rate channel’s efficiency  
Theoretically, exchange rate channel implies that a decrease in domestic real 
interest rates reduces attractiveness of domestic deposits in national currency, 
compared to deposits denominated in foreign currencies, and this results in a fall of 
deposits in national currency’s value compared to foreign currency deposits. What 
follows is a depreciation of national currency (E) which induces a decrease of 
domestic goods’ prices in foreign currency, resulting in an increase in net exports 
(NX) and consequently, an increase in the overall production (Y).  
However, in the CEMAC Zone, this channel is experiencing a fatal hindrance 
due to the practice of fixed exchange rate set by monetary cooperation agreements 
between the CEMAC States and France, the former colonial power. Unlike the 
generalization of floating exchange regimes in the 1980s, the CEMAC countries 
have remained in fixed exchange towards specific monetary relationships they have 
with the French Treasury, and which had not work without causing monetary 
sovereignty problems to these countries. This transmission mechanism thus 
undergoes a structural institutional blockage, and can no more regularly acts 
enough to allow a stimulation of economic financing. At the same time, it raises the 
issue of monetary sovereignty found in the "inconsistency triangle»
7
. In virtue of 
this, openness to foreign market is such a way that countries not controlling 
capital’s movement cannot effectively conduct autonomous monetary policies. In 
this case, an economy cannot simultaneously have a fixed exchange regime, an 
autonomous monetary policy and freely release capital (financial integration).   
2.1.2.2. The limited game of stocks’ price channel: the Tobin’s q   
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Monetary policy acting through the stocks’ price channel is transmitted on 
investment thanks to its effects on "Tobin's q" coefficient on the one hand, and on 
consumer’s wealth on the other.  
As concerns the Tobin's q coefficient (1969), it is defined as the ratio between 
companies’ market value and capital renewal cost. Thus, there is a positive linear 
relationship between the Tobin’s q and corporate investment. An expansive 
monetary policy raises the stocks’ price (Pa) which in turn increases the Tobin’s q 
coefficient, thus provoking an increase in companies’ investment expenditure (I), 
and consequently an increase in output (Y). Unfortunately, the relevance of this 
mechanism is not established within the CEMAC zone where financial markets 
remain underdeveloped. At least, it could be very low, as only three companies are 
listed in Douala
8
 Stock Exchange; the Central Africa Stock Exchange (BVMAC) 
located in Libreville, Gabon, being not much advanced
9
. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the Tobin's q and investment expenditure I is insignificant. In 
the absence of an efficient stock exchange, this channel appears ineffective. 
Therefore, monetary policy cannot pass through stocks’ price to effectively convey 
its effects in the productive sector.   
The stocks’ price channel acts on consumption through wealth’s effects. This 
channel has been highlighted by Modigliani (1971) in his life cycle model. He 
shows that consumption expenditures are determined by consumers’ resources 
throughout their lives. These resources consist of human capital, physical capital 
and financial wealth - or heritage. The shares are thus considered as a major 
component of financial wealth. Also, when the stocks’ price increases, the value of 
this financial wealth rises, the overall consumers’ resources during their lifetime 
also increase and consequently their consumption. However, given the households’ 
low income, the embryonic state of the CEMAC zone financial markets as well as 
the very low participation of SMEs in the sub-regional stock exchange, this 
mechanism also remains limited, and cannot be an effective transmission tool of 
the BEAC monetary policy to the real sector.  
These channels being ineffective to optimally transmit the CEMAC zone 
monetary policy, it is appropriate to focus on credit channel which parameters will 
therefore be measured.  
2.2. Theoretical Justification of Credit Channel  
Based on microeconomic arguments such as information asymmetry, nominal 
rigidities and market incompleteness
 10
, the New Keynesian Economy notes the 
market failure, hence the need and monetary policy effectiveness in financial 
contracts conclusion. Its main proponents, Akerlof (1970), Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), 
Mankiw (1986), Greewald (1995), Yellen & Romer (1990) agree on two 
fundamental points: currency is not neutral; market imperfections lead to non-
optimal financial contracts, the need for public intervention to correct bank credit 
market failures. Theoretically speaking, credit channel is based on the idea that 
monetary policy leads to bank portfolio shifts which lead to bank credit possible 
change. Credit channel acts as follows: an expansionary monetary policy (for 
example) which helps to increase reserves and bank deposits, increases the volume 
of available bank loans. This increase in loans leads to a rise in investment 
spending (and eventually of consumption), resulting in an increase in economic 
activity (Mishkin et al., 2010).    
Credit channel can be in two forms: broad credit channel or financial 
accelerator, and narrow credit channel also called bank credit channel. Broad credit 
channel implies that there are borrowers who, due to their rather large financial 
sphere, can access other financing forms than bank credit. The debate on monetary 
policy transmission to real economy has recently been revived in the early 2010s 
by Artus & Broyer (2014) who find that after the 2007-2010 financial crisis, no 
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transmission channel no longer works in the Euro zone. This issue had already 
brought some interest ten years ago in United States, Europe (McCallum, 2004, 
Mishkin, 1994) and in developing countries (DCs). Monetary policy may affect 
real economy through the availability and terms of granting loans by banks (Villieu 
& Lavigne, 1996). The influence of credit dynamics on growth and economic 
development had already given rise to numerous studies. Thus, Schumpeter (1911, 
1923) considers financial institutions as a prerequisite for technological innovation 
underlying growth. Financial intermediaries thus form the cornerstone of new 
questions about the monetary policy transmission mechanisms (Villieu & Lavigne, 
1996). It should be noted that credit analysis as monetary policy transmission 
mechanism makes its way from Tobin & Brainard (1963) investigations. In this 
same approach, Romer & Romer (1989) establish that a restrictive monetary policy 
reduces the money supply (M2), and leads to a contraction of bank credit. What 
follows is a fall in investment which depresses the economic activity.                  
Bernanke
11
 & Blinder (1992) on the one hand, Kashyap & Stein (1993), on the 
other examine, in the American context, the influence of monetary policy on bank 
credit supply, and show the existence of a bank lending channel. Lavigne & Villieu 
(1996) make the distinction between broad and narrow lending channels. They also 
present an evaluation process of the lending channel through the autoregressive 
vectors’ method (VAR). Guille (1996) presents an analysis on the influence of 
information asymmetries in monetary policy transmission through the lending 
channel. Goux (1996) conducts an empirical verification test on credit narrow 
channel in France, and shows that it is possible to measure the width, depth and 
flow rate of bank lending channel. Joseph (1996) observed in the case of 
Cameroon, the extent of bank credit rationing, and presents the criteria - however 
disincentive- of banks’ credit supply.   
Investigations within the CEMAC framework show that banks in the BEAC 
zone, though restructured and because of their atomicity, seem unprepared for 
development financing and globalization challenge (Bekolo-Ebe 1998, Okah- 
Atenga 1998). Similarly, more recent studies show that the CEMAC financial 
sector has been remediated, and that banks have become profitable and have more 
excess to liquidity (Avom, 2006). But the financial system highly segmented is still 
unable to finance development (Hugon, 2007).  
Finally, it appears that "a significant consequence of bank lending channel is 
that monetary policy has a strong impact on Small Enterprises’ expenditure. They 
are more dependent on bank loans than large companies. The latter have direct 
access to capital markets without any solicitation from banks” (Mishkin et al., 
2010, p. 836). To study and make use of this channel may prove itself beneficial 
for developing countries, especially those of the CEMAC zone which productive 
sphere consists mainly of Small and Medium Enterprises. 
 
3. Credit channel assessment in the CEMAC zone 
methodological approach  
To assess credit channel in this context is to quantify the width, speed, depth, 
and time limit, using statistical and econometric techniques applied to monetary 
policy transmission variables. This requires two types of tests: those which are 
prerequisites for the VAR usage (stationary test and cointegration test) and those 
which assess credit channel’s depth, speed, width and time limit (causality test and 
VAR test). The VAR model predictive power used in our analysis helps to measure 
the direction, magnitude and duration with which a monetary impulse affects 
macroeconomic variables (Friedman, & Schwartz 1963; Sims 1980; Lavigne, 
Villieu 1996). This method therefore facilitates the forecasts as far as monetary 
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policy decision-makings are concerned. The auto-regressive vector’s estimate will 
therefore be done from consolidated data from six countries of the Monetary Union 
of Central Africa (UMAC).  
There is abundant literature on how to assess monetary policy transmission 
acting through financial variables. It can be mentioned for this purpose, the 
Bernanke & Blinder (1992) investigations, those of Friedman & Kuttner (1992). 
Moreover, empirical works on monetary policy implementation oriented towards 
the financing of nominal Gross Domestic Product were done by Taylor (1985, 
1993); McCallum (2004, 1988, 1990); Motley & Judd (1991); Hess & Brayton 
(1992) and Feldstein & Stock (1994). Though based on the evolution of financial 
variables’ analysis which is part of credit channel constitution, the monetary policy 
transmission model we are trying to build heavily relies on economic theory 
developed up to date on the financial sector integration to real economy.  
This model which targets production through credit channel is built from two 
economic principles: the first refers to the theory targeting production (which 
impact variable here is the GDP’s aggregate) from an action on money supply. 
Broadly speaking, this is M2 retained as instrumental variable. In fact, there is a 
stable explanatory link between money supply M2 and nominal GDP (Feldstein & 
Stock, 1994) such that we have: GDP = f (M2). 
 The second principle on which we rely in the construction of our model 
addresses the Keynesian transmission mechanism as concerns  monetary policy 
through credit channel in situation of information  asymmetries (Lavigne, & Villieu 
1996; Mishkin, 1994) or under the use of the IS-LM model by introducing credit 
therein (Bernanke, & Blinder, 1988). These various studies have shown that an 
increase in money supply due to an expansive monetary policy increases bank 
deposits. What follows is an increase in credit supply which induces investment 
growth, thus resulting in production’s expansion.  
To estimate the monetary policy real effects, the empirical research often 
borrowed three methodological directions (Lavigne & Villieu, 1996). These 
include the structural models, the auto-regressive Vectors’ models (VAR) 
(Friedman & Schwartz 1963; Sims, 1980) and qualitative information (Romer & 
Romer, 1990). The approach used in this work extensively uses qualitative 
information. But, it is completed with autoregressive vectors’ analysis. This refers 
to time series econometrics which consists of observing the historical evolution of 
statistical variables’ series, and identifies the causal link they may have each other. 
By so doing, it is possible to identify explanatory closed and stable relationships 
between these various economic and financial variables involved. The VAR 
method helps to detect these types of relationships among which those expressing 
plausible economic behaviours are chosen, based on economic theory.  
Our approach is therefore not a priori based on an existing economic model, but 
rather on observation of facts revealed by statistical data on macroeconomic 
aggregates that make up the credit channel. However, we have presumptions on a 
possible configuration of relationships between monetary policy instruments and 
objectives from economic theory as reflected in Bernanke & Blinder (1988) model. 
These relationships involve the sequential succession from cause to effect, 
variables’ response in monetary policy transmission process by credit channel 
towards production’s target. Based on statistical tests’ results, we seek to measure 
credit channel’s parameters, which is a transmission privileged mechanism of the 
BEAC Zone monetary policy.  
Any monetary policy instruments’ manipulation leads to a rapid change in 
money supply (Ramey, 1993). The latter thus appears as a key indicator both in 
monetary policy management than in its transmission in real economy (Mc Callum, 
2008, 2005; Brunner, 1968). That's why we chose M2 as a monetary policy 
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indicator variable for the BEAC. The choice of this monetary aggregate holds 
moreover, to the adoption by the BEAC, of money supply increasing standards 
policy, which consists in acting in fixed rule to determine ex ante the growth rate of 
the amount of money in economy. This mechanism is fundamentally based on 
banks’ money creation function, following a credit multiplier process. With money 
supply (M2); Investment (INV) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), we can 




M2       Credits     INV      GDP 
Using the VAR method, the existence of direct or indirect links between 
specified variables in this monetary policy transmission channel (bank lending 
channel) can then be verified. And using the time series econometric method, we 
can also observe the historical evolution of these variables, taking into account the 
causal relationships relative to each other.  Meaning and intensity of each causal 
link are revealed between two variables by Granger’s test (1969). This analysis 
helps to induce an explanatory relationship between credit channel variables, using 
autoregressive vector’s tests which enable to induce the overall production’s (GDP) 
regression. We then express the global output according to other aggregates and 
their own past values, following different correlations selected from the VAR test. 
The latter effectively allows obtaining these correlations while indicating their 
respective meanings and intensity.   
GDP appears in this context as the main target to be reached by monetary 
policy. We don’t ignore other models which target output’s inflation and growth 
(Taylor, 1993). However, we would like to lay emphasis on credit role in monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in developing economies such as those of the 
CEMAC Zone, using the VAR tool. Tests made directly relate to aggregates from 
monetary statistics; here, we use the BEAC annual data and those of the African 
Development Indicator (ADI) of the World Bank. This clarification being given, 
we can carry out the mathematical formulation of the VAR process.  
3.1. Mathematical Formulation of the VAR  
Given a vector Yt consisting of k endogenous variables representing the studied 
economy, the VAR model with k variables and p shifts also called autoregressive 
model of order p [Ar (p)] can be written: 
 
Yt = a1 Yt-1 + …+ apYt-p + μ + εt.       (1) 
 
Taking into account the influence of other explanatory variables on Yt , then we 
find ourselves in the general case with an equation: 
 
Yt = a1Yt-1 + …+ apYt-p + b1X1t-1 + …+ b2Xmt + μ + εt       (2)  
 
Where Xi are exogenous variables which can be delayed. The structural VAR 
helps to obtain the reduced VAR: 
 
Yt   = A0  + A1Yt-1   +  A2Yt-2  + … + APYt-P   + ηt       (3) 
   
Where ηt  = Bo
-1 
εt     is a linear combination of structural shocks following a 





The use of the VAR model will then help to estimate a transmission function 
reflecting credit channel’s measurement in the form of the multiple regression 
model below: 
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with i the number of years shifted to be determined for each variable as a result of 
causality tests and i the regression coefficients to estimate. Monetary policy 
transmission variables through credit channel are: broadly speaking the money 
supply (M2); the domestic credit (CRI); the private sector’s credit (CRP); total 
investment (INV); the nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Causality tests’ 
interpretation and VAR thus presented will help to measure the different credit 
channel’s parameters.  
 
4. Findings and Discussion  
The tables below present cointegration and stationary tests’ results of the 
studied variables: 
 
Table 1. Stationary test’s results on credit channel’s variables in the CEMAC Zone  
Variable M2 CRI CRP INV GDP 
Order d’intégration I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Source: Authors' estimates from the BEAC annual data and those of the African Development 
Indicator (ADI). 
 
It shows that all community variables’ series used are stationary and integrated 
of order 1. In other words, the level of the studied variables in current year depends 
on their previous year level. It can therefore be envisaged a stable long-term or 
cointegration relationship between the CEMAC zone credit channel’s variables. 
The table below which presents different Johansen’s cointegration tests shows that 
M2, CRI, CRP, INV and GDP series are all cointegrated of order 1, this at 95% 
confidence level (see cointegration test table in appendix), thus confirming the 
specification of long-term and stable relationships between the studied variables.  
 
Table 2. Johansen’s cointegration test results   
Eigenvalue Likelihood ratio 
(LR) 
Critical  Value 
(CV) at 5% 
 
Critical  Value 




 0.805356  136.4105  87.31  96.58 None  ** 
 0.464438  70.94709  62.99  70.05 At most one ** 
 0.418618  45.96958  42.44  48.45 At most two  * 
 0.286021  24.27567  25.32  30.45 At most three 
 0.236613  10.79961  12.25  16.26 At most four 
Note: The stars * (**) designate the non-cointegration hypothesis’s rejection and therefore the 
acceptance of cointegration at 5% (1%) and CE the number of supposed cointegration equations. 
 
The possible causal link between variables was performed using the Granger’s 
(1988) test. Indeed, according to him, X "Granger cause" Y, if Y can better be 
predicted from the past of Y and X rather than from the past of Y only. The test 
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 bivariate causality test: null hypothesis, Ho: X does not ("Granger    
cause " not Y.) 
                  X/Y P (1 delay) P (2 delays) 
M2 / CRI 





CRI / INV * 















































Source: By ourselves, based on BEAC data.  
Note: The table’s values indicate the probability P associated with Fisher’s F testing 
coefficients’ nullity hypothesis of Y regression in X. A low figure (below 5%) identified in 
bold, indicates that the risk to wrongly reject the null hypothesis is low and therefore, 
causality can be accepted. We selected the 1 and 2 delays for convenience reasons, with the 
VAR used next and because variables’ series are annual. The star * designates the 
interesting causalities for monetary policy transmission. 
 
It appears that domestic credit (CRI) causes investment (INV) according to 
Granger’s view with a delay of two years and an error risk of 2.1% only (CRI    
INV ). The private sector’s credit (CRP) causes investment (INV) according to 
Granger’s view with a delay of one year and a negligible error risk of 3.5% (CRP 
INV). This result confirms the choice of the private sector’s credit (CRP) as 
credit channel transmission variable because it acts quickly and positively (one 
year) on investment than domestic credit. The different causal relationships 
detected can then be analyzed and interpreted in terms of credit channel’s 
measurement according to Mishkin’s (1996) perspective.  
Money supply M2 causes nominal GDP according to Granger’s view with a 
delay of one year or two (M2    GDP). Though these results are all 
interesting, we will retain the most significant, namely money supply’s direct 
influence on GDP with a delay of one year. This result is an empirical confirmation 
of economic theory as reflected in Brunner’s (1968), McCallum’s (2008) and 
Taylor’s (1985) works, and especially those of Feldstein & Stock (1994) which 
establish the existence of a strong and stable relationship between money supply 
M2 and nominal GDP. They conclude that money supply M2 can validly be used 
as indicator variable for monetary policy because it has a significant explanatory 
power on real economic activity represented by the GDP’s ultimate objective. 
That’s why we chose M2 as monetary policy indicator variable.      
4.1. Credit Channel Parameters’ Analysis in the CEMAC Zone  
4.1.1. Credit channel’s width in the CEMAC Zone 
Credit channel is said to be wide when the financial system offers borrowers the 
double opportunity to get funding they need, either from banks as loans or from 
financial market through the issuing of shares or bonds. This situation implies a 
perfect substitutability between bank loans and bond debt. Concretely speaking, 
bank credit supply should be compared to market financing (channel width). Credit 
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channel remains narrow in the CEMAC zone. The Monetary Union of Central 
Africa (UMAC) financial system’s architecture reveals that more than 91% of 
funding as far as the region's economies are concerned still comes from bank loans, 
and less than 9% from financial markets only (Central Africa Stock Exchange in 
Libreville, and Douala Stock Exchange in Cameroon). Indeed, in October 2014, 
domestic credit supply amounted to 6,001 billion CFA francs, while market 
capitalization of the zone is 626 billion CFA francs
13
. This situation forced 
companies to almost exclusively rely on bank credit for their external funding. 
Taking advantage of this privileged position, banks require a significant premium 
which value is a decreasing function of the ratio: amount of pledgeable wealth / 
amount of external funding (Bernanke & Gerttler, 1989). Richest companies 
remain privileged in this financing system. Most SMEs are therefore evicted from 
credit market, even though they make up the CEMAC’s essential productive tools. 
Face to such financial architecture, monetary shocks are propagated through 
external financing cost insofar as external financing premium borne by borrowers 
depends on their financial situation.      
4.1.2. Credit Channel’s outflow in the CEMAC Zone                    
Credit channel’s outflow is the Central Bank’s own ability to influence bank 
credit supply. It is revealed by credit aggregates’ reaction degree to the Central 
Bank’s impulses. It is established through causality test between monetary policy’s 
(M2) indicator variable and bank credit supply represented by credit aggregates 
(CRI and CRP). The strength of this causal link can be confirmed by the VAR test 
(Mishkin, 1996; Goux, 1996). Causality test reveals a lack of influence of money 
supply (M2) on bank credit supply (CRI or CRP) in the CEMAC zone. Money 
supply M2 does not cause domestic credit as far as Granger’s view is concerned. 
Therefore, the Central Bank’s decisions in any way do not affect banks’ credit 
supply. Their arbitrages in favour of credit supply’s increase or reduction would 
therefore be primarily made based on banking firms’ microeconomic behaviour 
oriented towards maximizing their profit. It is said in this case that credit channel 
has a low speed. Monetary authorities do recognize this shift. "In principle, because 
there is a gap between the monetary authority’s will and reality on the banking 
field". All kinds of manipulations are found in banks to override the Central 
Bank’s
14
 decisions.   
4.1.3. Credit Channel’s Depth in the CEMAC Zone   
Credit channel’s depth designates the most sensitive credit aggregate in the 
Central Bank’s monetary policy (Goux, 1996). The next step is to identify among 
credit aggregates present in economy, the most sensitive one to the Central Bank’s 
impulses (channel depth). This aggregate is, in this case, the key variable for 
monetary policy transmission through credit channel. We have selected two credit 
aggregates to be tested: the domestic credit (CRI) and private sector’s credit (CRP). 
Although causality from Granger’s view between monetary aggregate M2 and 
credit aggregates (CRI and CRP) is not statistically established, it is noted however 
from the VAR’s simulations that credit to the private sector (CRP) more fully 
reacts than domestic credit (CRI) to the Central Bank’s impulses represented in this 
context by M2 variations. Thus, it can be logically argued that credit’s depth is 
represented by the private sector (CRP) which is more sensitive to the BEAC 
monetary policy. Credit aggregate to be selected in monetary policy transmission 
model within the Monetary Union of Central Africa (UMAC) is the private sector’s 
credit (CRP). Thus, this is what credit channel’s depth in the Union is all about.  
4.1.4. Credit channel time limits in the CEMAC Zone   
 Credit channel time limit is the reaction period of the GDP to the Central 
Bank’s impulses. Causality’s and VAR’s tests help to determine this time in terms 
of the number of shifted periods based on how data used are monthly, quarterly or 
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yearly. Credit channel will be most effective in such a way that its effects will be 
quickly felt on real economic sector. In addition, Friedman (1948) distinguishes 
internal and external time limit. The first refers to the required time for an 
economic issue to be known, the choice of an instrument and its implementation. 
The second materializes the required time for an instrument’s modification effects 
to be felt on the targeted economic policy final goal. Empirical studies reveal that 
these credit channel time limits are 9 months on average as concerns the United 
States (Romer & Romer, 1993), and 12 months for France (Goux, 1996). The use 
of causality tests only in this work, to explain the BEAC monetary policy 
transmission is proved insufficient. We therefore completed them with the 
autoregressive Vector’s analysis presented in the table below, which reveals a two-
year period between the shock on money supply and the GDP reaction in the 
UMAC case:   
 
Table 4. V.A.R Results and UMAC test 
Period 1960 - 2012 
 Number of observations : 52  
 Standard deviations and Student t Statistics  (in parenthesis) 
 M2 CRI CRP INV GDP 
M2(-1)  0.686484  0.746151  14.93337 -0.526342  0.117850 
  (0.35282)  (6.04418)  (33.3440)  (0.48480)  (1.10301) 
  (1.94568)  (0.12345)  (0.44786) (-1.08569)  (0.10684) 
CRI(-1)  0.001740  0.511206 -1.386699 -0.016126  0.033006 
  (0.01140)  (0.19527)  (1.07723)  (0.01566)  (0.03563) 
  (0.15261)  (2.61800) (-1.28729) (-1.02964)  (0.92624) 
CRP(-1)  0.001473  0.013809  0.949237  0.002063  0.001241 
  (0.00222)  (0.03795)  (0.20936)  (0.00304)  (0.00693) 
  (0.66503)  (0.36388)  (4.53408)  (0.67776)  (0.17925) 
INV(-2) -0.105982 -2.469272 -8.295943 -0.227330  0.085126 
  (0.12394)  (2.12321)  (11.7132)  (0.17030)  (0.38747) 
 (-0.85510) (-1.16299) (-0.70826) (-1.33486)  (0.21970) 
GDP(-1)  0.101832  .511016  7.295286  0.579809  1.429256 
  (0.09763)  (1.67253)  (9.22688)  (0.13415)  (0.30522) 
  (1.04301)  (0.90343)  (0.79066)  (4.32200)  (4.68267) 
C -155.8217 -1806.171 -3702.102 -245.2649 -82.30050 
  (95.5518)  (1636.88)  (9030.22)  (131.294)  (298.717) 
 (-1.63076) (-1.10342) (-0.40997) (-1.86806) (-0.27551) 
 R2  0.985666  0.965932  0.964649  0.984462  0.995045 
 R2 ajusted  0.980724  0.954184  0.952459  0.979104  0.993336 
Source: Our findings from BEAC data (2013) and those of the World Bank (WDI, 2012)  
Reading the table: The various credit channel’s variables are presented in columns, assuming each 
of them is individually explained by other variables taken as delayed endogenous submitted online. 
Online are explanatory variables or delayed endogenous. In bold are indicated the reaction 
coefficients of various variables in relation to each other. The table above only retains significant 
relationships between the model’s variables; some lines have therefore been deleted (the complete 
VAR table in available from the authors). 
 





GDPt  = 0.118M2t-1 + 0.033CRIt-1  + 0.001241CRPt-1 + 0.085INVt-2  + 1.429GDPt-1  - 82. 30 + μt 
               (1.10301)     (0.03563)         (0.00693)             (0.38747)         (0.30522)     (298.717)  
               (0.10684)      (0.92624)        (0.17925)             (0.21970)           (4.68267)   (-0.27551)      
   R
2 = 0.99    ; F = 582.33 
                     
 Fisher’s statistics reveals the global significance of the model (F = 582.33 > 
F5/34 =3.71) and coefficients obtained all have the expected signs, thus materializing 
a favourable reaction of the GDP to financial variables. However, the coefficients’ 
individual significance shows that only the GDP delayed on a period (GDPt-1) is 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(4), J.L. Ekomane, & B. Yamb, p.744-766. 
757 
757 
significant; in other words, to predict the overall GDP in the CEMAC zone as a 
whole, one can mainly only rely on its previous year level.  
The Akaike’s and Schwarz’s tests results presented in table 5 enable to 
determine the maximum number of delays that can be retained on explanatory 
variables.  
 
Table 5. Number of Delays Following Information Criteria (Akaike and Schwarz) 
Delays  Akaike  Schwarz 
1 78.48081 79.73465 
  2* 78.438  80.76027 
3 78.09002 81.50246 
Source: Our results 
 
We chose the shift number 2 because it provides the most expected coefficients 
in the model. More specifically, investment reacts with two periods (INVt-2) of 
delay, while the other GDP explanatory variables (M2t-1, CRIt-1, CRPt-1) react with 
a shift of one year only. Investment therefore reacts slowly in the CEMAC zone, 
that is, two years to induce production. This is a plausible period in view of the 
sub-regional economy’s structure which burdens can’t enable a faster response. 
The VAR model thus estimated helps to assess macroeconomic variables’ response 
and sensitivity to the Central Bank’s impulses through impulse response functions 
and the forecast error variance analysis of these variables. 
 4.2. Macroeconomic responses’ assessment to monetary impulses: 
impulse response functions 
The following graphs show the responses to shocks on structural residues of the 
five (5) variables used in the model. We selected 3 monetary variables on which 
we simulated the shocks: money supply M2, domestic credit (CRI) and the credit to 




Graph 1. Response of Credit Channel’s Macroeconomic Variables to a Shock on Money 
Supply M2 
 
In view of these figures, it is clear that an expansive monetary policy which 
results in an increase in money supply is followed by a number of effects on other 
economic and financial variables included in the model.  
Thus, an increase in money supply leads to a rise on 3 years of the domestic 
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increase in money supply leads to an increase in domestic credit in the UMAC 
zone as a whole. And all things being equal however, this impulse is maintained for 
a period of three years. It strengthens the causality presumption according to 
Granger’s view which does not clearly appear in the causality test.  
The effect of private sector’s credit to increase money supply is positive. This 
effect is higher than that recorded in domestic credit. This amplifying impulse is 
maintained over three years before steadily decreasing up to the 10
th
 year. 
Innovation impact on money supply M2 is very important insofar as it leads to a 
positive result on private sector’s credit which is often a growth- bearer. This result 
which had not been revealed by Granger’s causality remains important in the 
BEAC monetary policy decision-making.   
 Investment positively responds to an impulse on money supply during a short 
period of one year. However, the effect remains positive. Then, it is amortized 
before being cancelled at the 6
th
 year. This is a wealth effect which is more oriented 
on investment than consumption. Ensuring that there is sufficient liquidity in 
economy, the sub-regional States can give impetus to invest in SMEs and 
agricultural or industrial family firms to induce economic growth. 
Finally, the nominal GDP widely and positively reacts to an impulse on money 
supply for a period of three years. This effect is reduced thereafter. This is the 
confirmation of Granger’s causality test. These empirical results confirm the 
economic theory that monetary impulses are decisive in output changes, and that 
money supply is the surest index to measure these impulses provided they are 
properly controlled by the authorities (Brunner, 1968; Feldstein & Stock, 1994). 
 
 
Graph 2: Reaction of CEMAC economic aggregates to an impulse on domestic credit. 
 
Graph 2 above shows the magnitude, direction, and reaction period of economic 
aggregates to a pulse on domestic credit. Thus, a shock effect on domestic credit is 
felt on investment from the 2
nd 
year, and though remaining negative, it is 
accelerated from the 6
th
 year before experiencing a steady and sustained growth. A 
shock on domestic credit (CRI) acts positively on GDP over a year and a half. This 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Res pons e o f PIB to  One S.D. CRI Innov a tion
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 




Graph 3. Reaction of CEMAC economic aggregates to a pulse on private sector’s credit. 
 
Finally, graph 3 outlines the CEMAC macroeconomic aggregates’ response to a 
monetary policy impulse on private sector’s credit: a pulse on private sector’s 
credit increases investment for 3 years before the effect begins to fall. This effect is 
however not very wide in the CEMAC zone as a whole. Furthermore, a shock on 
private sector’s credit is very low on nominal GDP for 4 years before it steadily 
declines. 
4.3. Measuring the UMAC real sector’s sensitivity to BEAC monetary 
innovations: forecast error variance decomposition                   
When innovation explains a large part of the forecast error variance of a series, 
we deduce that economy is considered very sensitive to shocks affecting this series 
(Sims, 1980; Doan, 1992; Judge et al., 1987; Goux, 1996). CEMAC economies’ 
sensitivity to BEAC innovations can be analyzed by decomposing the forecast 
error variance of each of the variables used in the VAR model (M2, CRI, CRP, 
INV and GDP). This sensitivity aims at calculating, for each of the simulated 
innovations, its contribution to the forecast error variance of the variable 
considered. From this analysis’s
16
 results, it appears that: domestic credit (CRI) is 
sensitive enough (21%) to innovations on money supply. Its variability is due at 
77% to its own innovations and at 1.3% to innovations on nominal GDP. The credit 
private to the private sector (CRP) is sensitive at 36% to innovations on money 
supply M2. It reacts at 60% to its own innovations. The private sector’s credit 
shows a high sensitivity to an expansive policy. Investment (INV) is very sensitive 
to money supply’s (M2) innovations which explain at 60% the changes affecting it 
against 22% in respect to its own innovations. Finally, the GDP is highly sensitive 
(70%) to innovations on money supply M2. Production (GDP) very widely reacts 
to impulses on money supply. This result suggests that currency positively 
influences the productive sector.        
4.4. A confirmation of the BEAC Weak Influence on Bank Credit Supply  
The influence of money supply M2 is negligible on credit supply. This result 
confirms that of the causality test: money supply does not cause credit. BEAC 
monetary policy decisions are not therefore relayed (or very weakly) by secondary 
banks as far as their credit supply is concerned.  Monetary policy transmission by 
bank credit channel thus appears defective in CEMAC zone as a whole. The 
bottleneck could be in the relationship Central Bank-secondary banks. CEMAC 
Zone banks do not increase their credits even in case of expansionary monetary 
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capacity of the Central Bank to induce bank credit supply) is therefore not met. The 
BEAC zone monetary policy simply creates temporary disruption of banks’ assets 
portfolio without changing their credit supply. A liquidity surplus, following an 
expansionary monetary policy, is rapidly placed in reserve in the Central Bank 
through an asset-liability management technique rather than to be used in credit 
supply (Payelle, 1996). The CEMAC zone banks’ behaviour is rather disturbing the 
monetary policy transmission through credit channel.     
  
5. Conclusion     
Credit channel’s measurement analysis in the CEMAC Zone on which our 
investigation is carried out helps assessing the monetary policy transmission 
otherwise than through a simple check on a causal interaction between financial 
and macroeconomic variables, representatives of real economy. This second 
procedure is often used in similar studies. But the measurement of credit channel’s 
width, depth, speed and time limits of a debt economy like the one we have just 
studied seems more in line with the quantification of monetary policy decisions to 
guide the Central Bank’s action. This led us to detect the CEMAC Zone credit 
channel’s narrowness, the weak flow of the channel (that is to say, the weak 
influence of the BEAC on credit supply), its depth represented by the private 
sector’s credit aggregate sensitivity to the Central Bank’s impulses. Finally, we 
established a two-year time limit for the transmission of this policy to real 
economy. However, to correct the shortcomings noted, it would be wise to give 
more power to the Central Bank vis-à-vis secondary banks. For instance, it is worth 
defining a credit quota to be allocated to productive activities by each bank, 
particularly in terms of its monetary policy decisions. It appears therefore 
necessary to strengthen the control of banking activities, by ensuring that the 
BEAC's decisions are actually applied by banks. This balance should be in such a 
way that money supply corresponds to economic financing needs. Thus, as long as 
monetary policy cannot allow the banking system to fund capital formation which 
is a production and development tool, as long as it can’t help to finance SMEs and 
SMIs which create employment, as long as it cannot allow the restructuring of the 
productive system to go from an intermediation economy to production economy, 
it will remain ineffective for this zone. The question of monetary policy 
transmission efficiency through credit channel therefore lies in the perspective of a 
public action, able to generate necessary funds to push ahead the limits of 
maximum production potentials for economic emergence desired by the sub-
regional leaders. The Central Bank could therefore be democratically controlled by 
the sub-regional parliament, so as to pursue an economic growth objective (in a 
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1 Unconventional monetary policies consist of three types of measures: 1) quantitative easing aimed at 
increasing the quantity of money in the economy; 2) Credit easing by the intervention of the Central 
Bank; and 3) the anticipated action on rates’ curve to influence private agents’ behavior. 
2  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2000), Report 2000, p.31. 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2000), Report on Human Development in the 
World, p. 120. Arnaud Zacharie, (2000), "The ten boundaries of the HIPC’ initiatives," http: // 
HIPC limits. "The HIPC’ Initiative, beyond the media effects," Debt and Development, 
www.initiative HIPC. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2006), 2006 
report. 
3 World Bank (1981). Accelerated Development in Africa south of the Sahara. This report is generally 
called Berg Report.  
4 This is another reason for keeping currency introduced by Keynes in his analysis between 1937 and 
1939.  
5 Hysteresis is a term borrowed from physical sciences which means that a system’s equilibrium state 
is not independent of the path followed by this system to reach there. This argument is used by post-
Keynesians against the idea of a conceived economy’s spontaneous balance designed by classical 
economists. 
6 Policy rates being already closed to zero, he proposes the use of unconventional policies. 
7 Mundell Robert  quoted by Bénassy-Querré (2004), p.324 
8 Since the beginning of the Douala Stock Exchange’s (DSX) operations on June 30, 2006, only three 
companies are listed as follows: the Cameroon mineral water Company (SEMC), Cameroonian 
subsidiary of the French group Castel; the Cameroon Agricultural and Forestry Company 
(SAFACAM) and the Cameroon Palm Corporation (SOCAPALM). On March 5, 2012 for example, 
the market capitalization amounted to 106,958,558,645 CFA francs, while the bond market 
capitalization stood at 219,335 billion CFA francs, a total of 326,293,558, 645 CFA francs funding.   
9 The BVMAC sub-regional stock exchange recorded the following bonds: 100 billion FCFA by the 
Gabonese government in 2008; 7 billion FCFA by the Gabon Petro Company in 2010, 30 billion 
FCFA by the BDEAC to finance developmental projects in the sub-region. 
10 Particularly in developing countries’ financial markets such as those of the CEMAC zone, many 
information asymmetries are observed between lenders and borrowers, institutional nominal 
rigidities in particular, and market incompleteness leading to financial exclusion of many SMEs, of 
Very Small Enterprises and the working masses.   
11 The Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the US Central Bank from 2005 to 2013, Ben Bernanke who 
successfully applied the lending channel model through "quantity easing", the monetary policy 
called quantitative easing with special performance which earned him the title of Man of the year in 
United State thanks to good measures taken to solve the 2007/2010 financial crisis. 
12 The causalities of this relationship were tested below; they should be used in building the 
autoregressive vector’s model (VAR). 
13 Stocks’ and bonds’ cumulative values of the two sub-regional financial markets’ stock exchanges: 
Douala Stock Exchange (DXE) and the Central Africa Stock Exchange, the BVMAC of Libreville.  
Source:  www.dxe.cm and www.bvmac.com official sites. 
14 Interview with the head of Association of Professionals of credit institutions in Cameroon (APEC), 
reported in the Cameroon national daily news, See Cameroon Tribune No. 8650/4849 of July 27. 
2006, p. 5. 
15 Values in parentheses represent: for the 1st line, the standard deviations of the regression estimated 
coefficients; for the 2nd line, the calculated values of t-Student statistics. Their use leads to conduct 
significance tests of the estimated coefficients of this regression. 
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Unit Root Test for M2, CRI, INV, PIB, CRP 
Null Hypothesis: D(CRI) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.656913  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.148465  
 5% level  -3.500495  
 10% level  -3.179617  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(CRI,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/11/16   Time: 18:21   
Sample (adjusted): 3 53   
Included observations: 51 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(CRI(-1)) -0.980746 0.147327 -6.656913 0.0000 
C -4.72E+10 8.03E+10 -0.587652 0.5595 
@TREND(1) 5.16E+09 2.68E+09 1.924720 0.0602 
R-squared 0.480827    Mean dependent var 1.15E+10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.459195    S.D. dependent var 3.73E+11 
S.E. of regression 2.74E+11    Akaike info criterion 55.56834 
Sum squared resid 3.61E+24    Schwarz criterion 55.68198 
Log likelihood -1413.993    Hannan-Quinn criter. 55.61176 
F-statistic 22.22737    Durbin-Watson stat 1.967922 





Unit Root Test for M2 
Null Hypothesis: D(M2,2) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.37324  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.152511  
 5% level  -3.502373  
 10% level  -3.180699  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(M2,3)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/11/14   Time: 16:10   
Sample (adjusted): 4 53   
Included observations: 50 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(M2(-1),2) -1.583592 0.118415 -13.37324 0.0000 
C -5.20E+10 5.63E+10 -0.925050 0.3597 
@TREND(1) 3.25E+09 1.82E+09 1.785303 0.0807 
R-squared 0.791893    Mean dependent var 1.38E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.783037    S.D. dependent var 3.96E+11 
S.E. of regression 1.84E+11    Akaike info criterion 54.77681 
Sum squared resid 1.60E+24    Schwarz criterion 54.89153 
Log likelihood -1366.420    Hannan-Quinn criter. 54.82050 
F-statistic 89.42248    Durbin-Watson stat 2.281168 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Unit Root Test for INV 
Null Hypothesis: D(INV) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.474027  0.0002 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.148465  
 5% level  -3.500495  
 10% level  -3.179617  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INV,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/11/14  Time: 16:13   
Sample (adjusted): 3 53   
Included observations: 51 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(INV(-1)) -0.766361 0.140000 -5.474027 0.0000 
C -1.68E+11 1.04E+11 -1.606054 0.1148 
@TREND(1) 1.29E+10 3.94E+09 3.268651 0.0020 
R-squared 0.384679    Mean dependent var 1.44E+10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.359041    S.D. dependent var 4.27E+11 
S.E. of regression 3.42E+11    Akaike info criterion 56.00870 
Sum squared resid 5.60E+24    Schwarz criterion 56.12234 
Log likelihood -1425.222    Hannan-Quinn criter. 56.05213 
F-statistic 15.00403    Durbin-Watson stat 2.055660 






Unit Root Test for GDP 
Null Hypothesis: D(GDP) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -10.19820  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.148465  
 5% level  -3.500495  
 10% level  -3.179617  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GDP,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/11/14   Time: 16:15   
Sample (adjusted): 3 53   
Included observations: 51 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(GDP(-1)) -1.367523 0.134095 -10.19820 0.0000 
C -6.59E+11 3.97E+11 -1.658973 0.1036 
@TREND(1) 6.18E+10 1.41E+10 4.393736 0.0001 
R-squared 0.684224    Mean dependent var 3.37E+10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.671067    S.D. dependent var 2.33E+12 
S.E. of regression 1.34E+12    Akaike info criterion 58.73993 
Sum squared resid 8.60E+25    Schwarz criterion 58.85357 
Log likelihood -1494.868    Hannan-Quinn criter. 58.78336 
F-statistic 52.00321    Durbin-Watson stat 1.944518 
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Unit Root Test for CRP 
Null Hypothesis: D(CRP) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.343592  0.0059 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.148465  
 5% level  -3.500495  
 10% level  -3.179617  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(CRP,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/11/14   Time: 16:17   
Sample (adjusted): 3 53   
Included observations: 51 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(CRP(-1)) -0.590189 0.135876 -4.343592 0.0001 
C -4.10E+10 4.69E+10 -0.873627 0.3867 
@TREND(1) 3.28E+09 1.62E+09 2.029136 0.0480 
R-squared 0.284944    Mean dependent var 8.96E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.255150    S.D. dependent var 1.84E+11 
S.E. of regression 1.59E+11    Akaike info criterion 54.47409 
Sum squared resid 1.21E+24    Schwarz criterion 54.58773 
Log likelihood -1386.089    Hannan-Quinn criter. 54.51752 
F-statistic 9.563800    Durbin-Watson stat 2.068207 
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